This is a re-creation of the post-incident interrogation
of the two flight crew survivors of 11/19/52

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Interrogation of:

       Major William F. Sawyer, AO 660295, Aircraft Commander

       1st Lt. Allan R. Winchester, AO 288660, Radar Operator

       (Aircraft Serial Number: 44-66392)

       Time: 1615 hours, 20 November, 1952

       The take-off was normal and the mission was flown as briefed to the I.P., a point on the shoran arc on approach #3, station pair Baker-Charlie. The planned I.P. time was 00291, and to the best of the knowledge of the two survivors being interrogated, actual I.P. time was 00311. The only equipment failure at this time was the IFF, which was completely out. The run into the target was normal, at an altitude of 23,250 FLPA. The target time was unknown, however, it was approximately 1 1/2 minutes prior to the "bombs away" time of aircraft #2173 which was 0049. Shortly after the bomb impact and the taking of strike photos, three flares were dropped in the path of the bomber. The first was 5000 feet high at 1 o'clock, a 20 degree turn to the left was made, and approximately 20 seconds later, the second flare appeared at 11 o'clock, 5000 feet high. Again a 20 degree turn to the right was made and approximately 20 seconds later, the third flare appeared at about 2 o'clock, and still at 5000 feet high. Immediately after this, two (2) searchlights came on and locked on the B-29, followed by between fifteen (15) to twenty (20) more. The lights remained locked on the B-29, followed by more for approximately four (4) minutes. At the time they came on the ECM equipment was operating fully, and the ECM operator, Jensen,

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said over the interphone: "there are too many frequencies, I haven't enough equipment to jam them all". At this time the tail gunner called out two (2) aircraft at 6 o'clock high, however, no pass was made at this time. Approximately two (2) minutes later, four (4) burst of fire described as "Red Tennis Balls" were received from 6 o'clock level and hits were received in the number 2 engine which caused damage and had to be feathered. As soon as this was accomplished, hits were received in the number 3 engine which was also immediately feathered. Hits were then received on the wing between the fuselage and number 3 engine. A fire was started here and could not be put out. All crew members were on oxygen during the bomb run, and no difficulty was encountered due to loss of pressurization. Right after the hits were received, the lights went off the aircraft, and the fighter made no more passes. Dutchboy was contacted on Dog Channel right after leaving the lights. At a point approximately ten (10) miles north of the Chongchon River, the heading of 200 degrees was received as an initial steer. At a point abeam of Pyongyang, and approximately 5 miles off shore, a corrected heading of 220 degrees was received from Dutchboy. At this time, the aircraft was decending (sic) at from 500 to 200 feet per minute, at an indicated airspeed of 280 miles per hour. At a point 10 miles northwest of Chinnampo, a third correct heading of 236 degrees was received. The route south at all times was generally parallel with the coast, and at no time more than 5 miles off shore. Right after the searchlight left the aircraft, the crew was alerted for bail-out, and all crew members prepared for bail-out. The situation was so critical

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that the task of taking off the chute to put on the anti-exposure suit and (get it) re-adjusted was not considered feasable (sic). The aircraft kept trim and was flown manually until two (2) minutes prior to actual bail-out. The radar equipment was functioning at all times and the V.O. was able to make radar images(?) up to the time just previous to leaving his station for the bail-out. The vacuum system and the majority of generators were out, the fluxgate compass was out, and shortly after receiving the last steer, the VHF faded out. The last message received from Dutchboy was that they were sending up flares. At this time the fire was burning the right wing, very close to the gas tanks, and streaming back as far as the Right Scanners blister, and the final decision to bail-out was made. The aft door was tied back, the bomb bay door was opened, the nose wheel lowered and the hatch salvoed. Approximately two (2) minutes later, having not seen any flares, the order to "bail-out" was given both verbally and on the alarm bell. The actual location of the island of Cho-do was unknown, but Major Sawyer felt they could wait no longer. The altitude was believed to be slightly more than 4000 feet. The bail-out order was as follows: AFTER ESCAPE HATCH - ECM Operator, Spare V.O., Tail Gunner, and V.O.   AFTER BOMB BAY - CFC, Left Gunner, Right Gunner.   FORWARD BOMB BAY - Radio Operator, and Navigator.   NOSE WHEEL HATCH - Spare Aircraft Commander, Bombardier, Engineer, Pilot, and Aircraft Commander. The estimated time taken to clear the aft section was forty (40) seconds, and for the front section one (1) minute. At the time the Aircraft Commander bailed out, the aircraft was approximately at 2800 feet altitude. After leaving the aircraft made a slow 270 degree turn to the left and hit the

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water approximately 1/2 mile north of the northern tip of the island of Cho-do.

       Major Sawyer's bail-out was accomplished in the following manner. After observing the crew members bail-out, and getting interphone calls from the rear saying the last man was leaving, he got out of the seat and stepped over the crash bar which was in position, climbed down the rungs on the side of the nose wheel well, and let go. As soon as he was clear of the aircraft, he pulled his rip cord and the chute opened normally with no perceptable shock.

       He was starting to slide back into the seat when he observed the first flare approximately 1 1/2 miles north of him, and could see he was over the island and close to the ground. He slipped the chute to prevent severe oscillation and to be sure of hitting the island. However, due to closeness to the ground, he soon stopped this measure and hit the ground backwards at the start of a new oscillation. He struck on the side of a hill and was rather gently lowered to a prone position on his back. The Major then rolled over, collapsed his chute and got out of his harness. He could see a glow from lights to the north of him, so he started walking in that direction. Shortly after starting off, he encountered a ROK Marine, and asked him if there were Americans to the north, and the ROK nodded "Yes" and left him. Major Sawyer then walked the balance of approximately 1 1/2 miles to the Americans.

       Lieutenant Winchester's experiences were as follows. After seeing the men in the rear bail-out, he called the Aircraft Commander and told

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him he was leaving the ship. He went through the after pressurized door and stood by the escape hatch in a croutched (sic) position with his arms crossed and leaned out falling into the slip stream. As soon as he encountered the block (?) of the slip stream, he pulled the ripcord and the chute caught without a noticeable jar. He had tightened his harness straps to the point where he could not sit back in the seat, which caused him to hang in a slightly flexed position. He could not see the shore and tried slipping the chute to guide him in that direction. At this time he observed one (1) parachute to the southeast of him, and two (2) to the northeast. He had unfastened the chest strap prior to hitting the water. The leg straps were not unfastened because he could not sit in the harness. His striking the water was described as "just sitting down in it", and he was submerged less than in a dive. He popped his Mae West and then collapsed his chute. Due to the tightness of the leg straps some difficulty was encountered in getting free of the harness. However, this was acomplished by slipping the straps down on his legs and unsnapping them. Because he could not open the dingy (sic) case by the zipper strap, he reached inside and released the CO2 bottle, which immediately inflated it fully. The Mae West was holding him in almost a horizontal position and he attempted to slide into the dingy (sic) on his back. This was unsuccessful and he finally climbed in at the small end in the approved fashion. He covered himself with the poncho cover of the dingy (sic) and opened the equipment case. Due to the cold and nervousness, he was only able to get out one paddle. He checked other equipment and decided not to use any of it at that time. However, he did attempt to contact

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some of the others by means of the whistle, but with no results. He visually fixed his position in relation to two mountains on the shore and attempted to paddle towards Cho-do. He could see no apparent motion and decided it was due to still having his parachute, harness, and dingy (sic) cover attached to the dingy (sic) and acting as a sea anchor. After paddling for an indefinite period of time, Lieutenant Winchester passed out due to coldness and exhaustion. After daylight he came to, and noted his position to be apparently off the west coast of Sokto island, in almost the same position in which he was the night before. Shortly afterward, a sam-pan sent from Cho-do picked up up (sic).

       Lieutenant Winchester was wearing long handled winter underwear, his wool coveralls, and the L-2 flying jacket as well as a winter-type flying helmet and jump boots. His probable length of time spent in the water was approximately fifteen (15) minutes and from bail-out to rescue about seven (7) hours.

       The remains of 1st Lt. beverly A. Swingle, Pilot, and 2nd Lt. Myron F. Sestak, Spare Radar Observer, were located soon afterward. The remaining crew members are officially listed as Missing In Action and are as follows: Major Kassel M. Keene, Spare Pilot; 1st Lt. Robert J. Bird, Navigator; 1st Lt. James K. Peck, Bombardier; M/Sgt Horace H. Tiller, Flight Engineer; T/Sgt Morton H. Jensen, ECM Operator; A1C James H. Porter, Radio Operator; A/1C Raymond Thompson, Left Gunner; A/1C William Whitman, Right Gunner; A/2C James L. Nichols, CFC Gunner; and A/2C Robert J. McLoughlin, Tail Gunner.

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